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Introduction 
 
Norwegian authorities often claim that the financial sector, and especially the 
securities market, is particularly vulnerable to activities of money laundering: 
“Traditionally the financial sector is held to be especially exposed to misuse for 
the purposes of money laundering” (Ot.ptp. no. 72 (2002.2003): 19). Money 
laundering is a recurrent theme in the Norwegian media. Usually the media tend 
to present the forms and extent of money laundering in simple and rather vague 
terms. One of the NRK‟s (Norwegian Broadcasting System) internet stories 
represents an illustrative example: “The amount of money laundered in Norway 
each year is NOK 140.000 million”.2 This is approximately equal to 20% of the 
Norwegian state budget and thus sounds very dramatic. The figure of 140.000 
million correspond to the amount of untaxed “black” money which Norwegian 
authorities claim is circulating each year. The terms “black”,  “dirty money” and 
“shadow economy” are themselves rather imprecise. The estimate encompasses 
everything from gains from crimes to untaxed work and the informal economy 
(Schneider and Enste 2003).  
 The numbers circulating in the media are based upon the assumption that all 
proceeds are laundered, an assumption which makes the black economy virtually 
equal to money laundering. According to Reuter and Truman (2004), this ap-
proach reflects the extreme difficulty in estimating how much money is laun-
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dered. Calculations
3
 done by Unger (2007) and Walker (2005) tend to overesti-
mate the proceeds of crime, especially drug related vices, and the need to laun-
der money (the portion laundered). The basic idea that „criminal money‟ must be 
laundered before they can be used is rarely questioned at all (Van Duyne 2003, 
Van Duyne, Groenhuijsen and Schudelaro 2005). This may be due to the fact 
that these authors adopt a narrow definition of laundering in the sense of „mak-
ing dirty money white‟. This contrasts with (usually legal) authors who adopt the 
definition of laundering as presented in international conventions and national 
legislation. These legal definitions encompass as laundering virtually every act 
following a successful crime-for-profit.  
 Our starting point is that every discussion on the forms and extent of money 
laundering must be based upon concrete empirical analyses of the conditions of 
money laundering and on a precise definition of this concept. This might sound 
obvious to researchers and scholars but it is far from obvious when it comes to 
(gu)estimates made by organizations as FATF, or in threat assessments (Van 
Duyne et al., 2005). Money-laundering concerns money obtained from crime, 
but not all criminally obtained money is laundered (in the narrow meaning of 
„making white‟) as it may be simply spent in daily life In addition, there is not a 
universal need or opportunities for laundering. This depends on the nature of the 
law enforcement surroundings of the offender.   
 For this reasons it is relevant to analyse two conditions: who has the possibil-
ity and the need to launder money. Control is of major importance in this con-
nection. Money laundering is a crime without a specific victim. Money launder-
ing per se does not create new victims apart from those connected to the predi-
cate offences. There is no prejudiced party that will have an interest to report the 
offence of money laundering to the police. Prevention and uncovering of laun-
dering or rather, conveying suspicions thereof, are completely left to the regulat-
ing system of banks, financial institutions and all other entities obliged to report 
unusual or suspicious transactions. 
 Furthermore, there are many economic sectors which offer opportunities for 
laundering: restaurants and pubs, real estate, or gambling. There is also concern 
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about crime-money being laundered in the higher financial echelons: the securi-
ties markets. If that concern is correct we have to ask who really has the oppor-
tunity to launder money in the securities market, is this a way of laundering 
which is available to everybody? Then there is the question of the profitability of 
different crimes (Reuter & Greenfield 2001) and the costs and reinvestments 
necessary for conducting crime (Van Duyne, 1996). Finally we investigate the 
need for money laundering with emphasis on organised crime in Norway. 
 
 
Definition of money laundering and the purpose of surveil-
lance 
 
Criminologists define money laundering in a more restrictive way as the ways of 
transforming dirty money into seemingly legal money (Levi 1997). The different 
methods have a common objective: re-integration of dirty money into the legal 
economy such that no suspicions are raised about its criminal origin.. This ob-
jective may be achieved, for example, by trading stocks in the securities market 
or through investments in real estate. Specific legal institutions and markets may 
thus be deliberately used with the intention of making dirty money appear as 
legal. This limits in a fruitful way what can be considered to be money launder-
ing. From a criminological point of view there is little sense in considering the 
mere use of dirty money for private consumption such as buying food and cloth-
ing and paying private bills without any financial construction, as money laun-
dering.  
 The Norwegian authorities‟ understanding of money laundering differs from 
this. Money laundering is regulated through the paragraph of receiving (stolen 
property) (§317) in the Penal Law. However, money laundering is not a specific 
legal concept and is consequently not defined in this paragraph. The authorities‟ 
understanding and limitation of the notion of money laundering is contained in 
the Act on money laundering
4
: 
The term “money laundering” is usually used about activity aiming at secur-
ing proceeds of criminal acts so that the proceeds may be used by the perpe-
trator or others. Such activity may consist of using, converting, transferring, 
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taking possession of or holding assets or to hide or disguise the assets’ true 
nature, origin, placement, beneficial use, movements, ownerships as well as 
trying to or contributing to the same, when the acting person should have 
known that the assets originate from criminal acts or from participation in 
criminal acts. (Ot.prp. no. 72 (2002-2003): 17) 
 
The authorities‟ understanding of money laundering thus comprises far more 
than the criminological delimitation indicates. All use of dirty money, including 
for ordinary private consumption, is qualified as money laundering. Based on 
this definition, currency smuggling in the form of physically moving cash across 
borders will also imply money laundering despite the fact that smuggling does 
not contribute to making the money appear legal. Smuggling does not integrate 
it into legal economy. It may be that the intention of the smugglers is not to dis-
guise the origin of the dirty money at all, but to hide its very existence. Moving 
cash may for example be a part of buying narcotics abroad. The authorities‟ 
definition of money laundering thus includes most ways of handling or dealing 
with dirty money i.e. all methods considered suitable to make the money un-
available to the authorities in addition to simply using, receiving or possessing. 
In this way the money-laundering concept widens to encompass all subsequent 
actions after the predicate crime, except destroying the loot or handing it imme-
diately in to the police (Van Duyne et al., 2005). 
 
 
Purpose of money-laundering control 
 
Anti Money Laundering legislation has several aims: first, to enable the authori-
ties to confiscate the proceeds from crime (Naylor 2003). Second, to reduce the 
motivation for committing the crimes-for-profit. Third, by confiscating illegal 
gains, the authorities hope to limit the possibilities to commit new crimes since 
the money will not then be reinvested in new criminal acts. However, this ap-
plies only to a limited number of crimes. Many crimes-for-profit do not require 
much investment, like organised fraud schemes or environmental crime. Finally, 
the regulation of money laundering should also be an instrument for investiga-
tors, on the assumption that money laundering will leave traces one tries to re-
veal the initial crime via laundering. “Trace the money” is the adage. (Naylor 
1999).  
 The anti money laundering regime primarily aims at intercepting the pro-
ceeds of „organised crime‟ with a historic special emphasis on drug offences. 
(Levi 1991; Savona and De Feo 1997). It is assumed that „organised crime‟ gen-
erates large illegal profits that in various ways are channelled into the legal 
economy. More recently, the aim is to address ill-gotten profits from white-
collar crime. (Ot.prp. no. 72 (2002-2003). As of 2001 the effort against terrorism 
has likewise become significant in order to substantiate the importance of con-
trolling money laundering. Overarching all these specific objectives is the gen-
eral aim to protect the „integrity of the financial system‟. An important corner-
stone of the financial system is the securities market. However, the security 
market is not only about money, but also about power which may be exercised 
by shares of corporations. Crime-money flowing into the securities market may 
therefore jeopardize the integrity of the management of corporations. For this 
reason it is relevant to investigate whether there is a threat to this financial sector 
and how it is protected. We will first elaborate the system and regulation of the 
Norwegian securities market. 
 
 
The Securities Market 
 
The trading of stock and bonds takes place in the highly regulated securities 
market.
5
 The brokerage firms are responsible for the trading of stock. This is a 
kind of individual service where they trade stock on behalf of different custom-
ers. Asset management firms trade various funds such as equity funds. A num-
ber of individuals own shares in one and the same fund. When the asset man-
agement firms are trading securities it is done collectively on behalf of all inves-
tors who own shares in a given fund. We shall concentrate on the brokerage 
firms. Nevertheless, the analysis in this article is also relevant to the asset man-
agement firms because the funds administered by them constitute an essential 
part of the securities enterprises‟ clientele. 
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 The market offers other services as well, for example in the form of “market mak-
ing”, i.e. trading with government bonds. Another kind of service is “investment 
banking”. In that context it is arranged for issuing offers; a process where limited 
companies offer new shares for sale. Our choice to focus on the trade of shares and 
bonds is caused by the fact that this part of the market is the one to attract the great-
est number of customers. Consequently it is the trade with shares and bonds which is 
primarily available for most people as a potential arena for money laundering. 
 Brokerage firms may roughly be divided into two categories. The first con-
sists of larger companies with a great number of employees and extensive trad-
ing. Their customers are primarily major institutional investors. The other cate-
gory consists of smaller firms with fewer employees and often less trading activ-
ity. Frequently these are „net brokers‟ who keep in touch with their customers 
via Internet. These securities enterprises focus to a larger extent on private cus-
tomers. Their clientele consists mainly of minor savers. 
 The state is by far the largest individual investor in the Norwegian securities 
market, namely through the state pension fund. Other large customers are the 
finance and insurance companies. 
 The brokerage firms are intermediaries in the trading of listed shares. They 
also trade stock in non-listed companies. This takes place outside the official 
marketplace that is the Oslo Stock Exchange and is usually called the grey mar-
ket. However, during recent years the trade on this market has been very low. At 
the Oslo Stock Exchange stock trading amounting to NOK 2.000 – 4.000 mil-
lions on a daily basis has been registered in 2008. 
 To be a customer in the securities market and trade stocks and shares it is 
obligatory to open an account with the Norwegian Central Securities Depository 
(VPS) where the ownership of securities is recorded. In addition, the transac-
tions have to be linked to an ordinary bank account. This implies that if crime-
money is being invested, it must already have entered the financial system as 
„non-suspect‟, which is tantamount to having been already laundered. 
  
A market thoroughly controlled  
 
The securities market is a thoroughly regulated market. An interviewed infor-
mant
6
 in the Securities and Investment Board describes the market as “more con-
trolled than other capital intensive markets such as the buying and selling of 
boats and cars.” The most essential feature when it comes to controlling poten-
tial money laundering transactions is that the securities enterprises are instructed 
through the Act on money laundering to monitor their customers and their trans-
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actions. It is mandatory to appoint an officer/department responsible to ensure 
that the securities enterprises are arranging for and carry out the following sur-
veillance of the customers and their transactions:  
  Identity control of the customers. When establishing a customer relationship, 
the customers are obliged to prove their identity through authorised identifi-
cation primarily by appearing in person.  
  Tape-recordings of all phone calls between the customers and the enter-
prise‟s brokers. 
  To register electronically and save for 5 years all orders from and informa-
tion about the customers. 
  Dubious transactions are to be examined more closely. If the suspicion is 
sustained, the enterprises are obliged to notify Økokrim (The National Au-
thority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental 
Crime) about the transaction in question. 
  Transactions appearing dubious and consequently subject to investigations 
can not be implemented until Økokrim is notified or gives approval. 
 
The Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway keeps the bro-
kerage firms under supervision by, among other things, controlling whether the 
enterprises comply with the regulations of the Act on money laundering. This is 
performed partly through random checks and partly based upon the examining 
of submitted documents from the enterprises. The persons responsible within 
brokerage firms may be sentenced to prison for up to one year if they fail to 
comply with stipulations of the Act on money laundering. 
 In addition, the banks indirectly control customers on the securities market. 
This follows from the demands to make use of a bank account when trading 
stocks. In this respect all money to be laundered in the securities market has to 
pass the banks‟ initial control. Hence, if any money slips through this control 
gate, it is already laundered. 
 
 
Nothing seen and nothing heard 
 
How many and what kinds of manifestations of money laundering has the Nor-
wegian anti money laundering regime detected? So far there have been no con-
victions of money laundering committed through the securities market. Nor can 
the two interviewed employees in the police force tasked with financial investi-
gation refer to any money laundering case in the securities market (Ingvaldsen 
2006). There are no cases in connection to companies listed on the Stock Ex-
change. According to the manager of the money laundering team at The Na-
tional Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environ-
mental Crime (Økokrim) their experience is the same. They have not come 
across the securities market during their work with any criminal cases on money 
laundering. The informant in the Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission 
of Norway states that they have not discovered any single incident of money 
laundering. The reply was “no” when questioned whether on one or several oc-
casions they had a specific suspicion of money laundering. Nor, according to the 
director of surveillance at Oslo Stock Exchange, has the Stock Exchange discov-
ered money laundering.
7
 The surveillance department at the Stock Exchange 
usually does not look specifically for money laundering. However, subsequent 
to the terror attack in the USA September 11, 2001, the Stock Exchange under-
took a major retrospective investigation searching for dubious transactions. The 
aim was partly to reveal money laundering. The inspection did not uncover any-
thing that Oslo Stock Exchange considered to be suspicious. The actors closest 
to the securities market and its buyers and sellers, the securities enterprises 
themselves, are furthermore reinforcing the impression that money laundering is 
non-existent. The number of suspicious transactions reports to The National Au-
thority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime 
from the securities enterprises reflects this. As from the years 2001 – 2005 inclu-
sive, The National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and 
Environmental Crime received 1, 1, 3, 2 and 2 such reports respectively, which 
could have involved money laundering (Økokrim 2005). By comparison banks 
reported between 900 – 1000 suspicious transactions per year in the same pe-
riod. (Økokrim 2005).
8
 This is in line with international findings. Gold and Levi 
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 In the public debate in Norway it has to a considerable extent been argued that the 
securities enterprises are not sufficiently disposed to examine more closely their cus-
tomers. This has been used as an explanation of the great difference in the amounts 
of reports between securities enterprises and banks. This however, is primarily 
caused by significant differences in the clientele of the two financial institutions. 
Compared to the securities market the banks have to a larger extent customers whose 
transactions are much easier to discover. It then follows that the alleged unwilling-
ness of the securities enterprises to control their customers is not a valid explanation 
(1994) have examined the British finance sector‟s notification of dubious trans-
actions. Compared to the banks the British securities enterprises reported very 
few suspicious transactions. Out of the total amount of suspicious transaction the 
reports from the securities enterprises constitute approximately 1 per cent. Van 
Duyne (2003) detected that in the assets confiscation database (1993-2000) the 
value of seized shares amounted to € 34.173, which is 0,1% of the total of seized 
assets. These findings do not support the fear that affluent criminals pose a seri-
ous threat to the securities markets. 
 Apparently, each and all sources tend to go in the same unambiguous direc-
tion. None has any money laundering to report. Does this signify that there ex-
ists no money laundering in the securities market? It is highly unlikely that no 
money laundering what so ever takes place within this sector of the Norwegian 
financial system. We have to ask additional questions. One explanation, the one 
that has dominated the Norwegian public debate, is that the apparently non-
existing money laundering is a result of the brokerage firms‟ lack of willingness 
to perform their control duties in accordance with the Money Laundering Act. Is 
this the case?  
 The findings make an affirmative answer hardly plausible, but do not exclude 
it. If not excluded, the next question is whether the existing approaches are ca-
pable of recognising on-going money laundering schemes. 
 If we accept the FATF approach of 3 phases of laundering, i.e. placement, 
layering and integration, we could comment that in the securities market only 
layering and integration can really take place, whilst the AML regime is really 
focused on placement (and no wonder, considering that the other two phases are 
so much more difficult to uncover, unless you can trace up from uncovered 
placement). 
 
Conscientious brokerage firms 
 
During his study on money laundering in the Norwegian securities markets Ing-
valdsen (2006) interviewed the head of the department in the Banking, Insurance 
and Securities Commission of Norway which is responsible for supervising the 
brokerage firms. He stated that their supervision shows that the brokerage firms‟ 
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practice is in compliance with the Act of Money Laundering. The brokerage 
firms are doing what they are supposed to do. Many companies, in different sec-
tors of business life, often have a very pragmatic rather than normative way of 
approaching issues regarding regulation and control (Schlegel, 1990). This is 
also the case when it comes to the Norwegian brokerage firms. The head of the 
department says that these companies are complying with their control duties. 
This is due to two main reasons. As long as the control duties that follow from 
the regulation on money laundering are mainly the same within the EU, the 
regulation does not create any kind of distortion of competition. Secondly, the 
brokerage firms have a self interest in at least some of the control measures. 
When trading stock on behalf of their clients the brokerage firms regularly find 
themselves in dispute with one ore more of their costumers. These costumers 
often claim that the brokerage firms have not been selling or buying stock to 
their best interest and therefore seek economic compensation. From such a per-
spective tape recordings of all phone calls between brokers and their customers 
come in handy
9
. That way the brokerage firms are able to document what they 
have said and what they haven‟t said. In several cases this kind of documenta-
tion has contributed to the brokerages firms winning disputes based on formal 
complaint by their costumers. 
 At the same time the Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Nor-
way are unable to supervise the brokerage firms‟ practice when it comes to one 
crucial element of the Act on money laundering. The head of the department 
states that since they are not familiar with the brokerage firms customers‟ nor-
mal patterns of transactions, they are not able to determine whether or to what 
extent the brokerage firms investigate and report dubious transactions the way 
the law oblige them to. Of course this is the part of the brokerage firms‟ control 
duties that basically runs contrary to one of the prime traits of the financial sec-
tor. To disclose information regarding customers‟ transactions are definitely not 
wanted. And in many cases there are legitimate business reasons for customers 
to appreciate secrecy. For instance, this applies when the buying of stock is a 
part of an acquisition of a company as a whole (Savona and De Feo, 1997). Fur-
thermore, the brokerage firms do not want to risk putting their customer in a 
situation where they face suspicion of money laundering in public. That could 
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cost both the customers and finally the brokerage firms a lot when it comes to 
both reputation and money. As such one may assume that at least in a few cases 
some brokerage firms choose to look the other way regarding transactions that 
initially come off as suspicious. This is probably especially the case when it 
comes to costumers that have been part of a brokerage firms‟ clientele for a long 
time and also constitute the brokerage firms‟ major costumers. In his study on 
the banking system in The UK Levi (1997) found that in a few cases the banks 
did not report transactions they them selves found to be suspicious. Even 
though, his main finding was that the banks‟ practice regarding investigation and 
reporting of dubious transactions was very conscientious: 
 “My interviews with major UK financial institutions make it very clear that a 
     desire to have a good reputation, combined with fear of imprisonment, have  
 generated a strong willingness to comply with the spirit as well as the words  
 of the legislation” (Levi, 1997: 274). 
 
There are strong reasons to believe that this is also the case regarding the Nor-
wegian brokerage firms. This is particularly due to the fact that during the last 
years, this segment of the financial system has become increasingly more occu-
pied with their public reputation. During the 1980s and the first half of the 
1990s, the Norwegian brokerage firms‟ reputation were somewhat dodgy, 
among other things based on cases in which some brokerage firms had taken on 
cash from some customers. According to the aforementioned head of department 
within The Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway the bro-
kerage firms are now in a process in which they are very sensitive to the need of 
a good reputation: 
 “The consciousness regarding reputation within the business are far greater 
 now than just five years ago. Then only one in ten would have been  
 interested in their reputation in the same way”. 
 
Combined with the fact that the brokerage firms have been beaten up in Norwe-
gian media for several years due to their alleged lack of willingness to investi-
gate and report their customers, it is highly unlikely that these companies would 
risk being displayed in the media as a channel for money laundering. 
 The above considerations lead to the conclusion that it is unlikely that the 
apparently non-existing money laundering within the Norwegian securities mar-
ket is a function of lack of effort within the brokerage firms to investigate or re-
port their customers‟ transactions. Therefore the next question is whether the 
existing approaches are capable of recognizing on-going money laundering 
schemes. 
 
 
Know your customer: The selective controlling eye. 
 
The control that brokerage firms are required to perform is based upon the prin-
ciple of „know-your-customer‟ (Ot. prp. No. 72 (2002-2003). As a consequence 
of the identification duty they are obliged to know the identity of the person, 
his/her National Insurance number, where she/he lives etc. However, the princi-
ple of knowing-your-customer is to a large extent also a question of knowing the 
customer as a financial actor, i.e. knowing the customer‟s normal transactions 
patterns. What kind of trading in the securities market does the customer usually 
perform, which amounts and which type of selling and buying will be natural for 
the customer within the scope of his business activity (if he is a businessman). 
The same goes for the banks. Their obligation is to know their customers so that 
they can be able to decide what will be the natural amount and the movements of 
the money coming from the customer‟s account. Obliged by the Act on money 
laundering the banks are using IT solutions to perform this part of the money 
laundering work. The data processing system is made to search for and report 
deviations from the norm given to the customer in the system.  
 Levi (1997) points out that the principle of know-your-customer upon which 
the surveillance of money laundering is based, represents the traditional police-
man‟s eye, i.e. the controlling eye searching for and becoming suspicious when 
it notices something that stands out. However, for two reasons cases of money 
laundering operations may not stand out from the ordinary operations. Primarily, 
as stated by Levi (1997) because not much distinguishes money laundering from 
ordinary and legal financial transactions other than the purpose of the transac-
tion, which is defined as illegal. If money laundering is embedded in on-going 
business routine, it takes place on the same financial arena as most other finan-
cial transactions. Secondly, white-collar crimes frequently are hardly distin-
guishable from ordinary legal transactions and by their very nature fit into the 
framework of an otherwise legal enterprise (Clarke 1990). We will not be able to 
recognise them if we are looking for something exceptional and unusual. In 
other words, they must not be spotted as aberrations from the legal routines of 
enterprise. 
 In our context this implies that some money laundering actions related to 
business activities which otherwise are legal, quite simply are not distinguish-
able. Consequently the application of “know-your-customer” controls will not 
detect money laundering since these controls are sensitive only to the “excep-
tional and the different”. The following hypothetical cases will exemplify this: 
An actor usually operating within the securities market under the auspices of an 
investment company has committed insider trading. To hide the money‟s illegal 
origin it is circulated onwards and interwoven with comparable business transac-
tions in the same market.  
 How should an employee in a security enterprise or in a bank be able to sus-
pect that the money on normal accounts originate from insider trading? (Unless 
he is aware of such trading) The transaction ordered by the actor to disguise the 
illegal origin of the money is a transaction he normally carries out by virtue of 
his role as a completely legal trader in the securities market. There is no reason 
to be alarmed. This also applies to some other kind of economic crime such as 
manipulation of exchange rates. The dirty money will not be standing out when 
handled by regular business actors whose money laundering activities differ in 
nought from their usual legal activities. This will be reinforced by good existing 
commercial reasons for transactions which would seem peculiar to the uniniti-
ated. This includes share trading at a cut rate as well as overcharged shares, a 
usable method to give dirty money an apparently legal starting point. But some-
times there are valid business reasons for trading shares at a cut price or to over-
charge for example to avoid taxation
10
 (Savona and De Feo 1997). 
 International studies showing reviews of suspicious transaction reports sup-
port the impression that surveillance does not catch transactions based on and 
within the framework of legal business. Gold and Levi (1994) have examined 
reports from the economic sector in Great Britain that clearly indicate what con-
trol based upon the principle of know-your-customer brings to knowledge and 
fail to bring to knowledge One reason for failing to recognize suspicious transac-
tions is that customers are already inside the legitimate system after initial clear-
ance. The reports contained an evident majority of private persons who had 
acted precisely like private persons through their use of personal accounts. More 
than 50 per cent of the suspicious transaction reports were linked to cash bank 
deposits and to a great degree only one bank account was used. The reports rep-
                                                 
10
 As opposed to tax evasion that is illegal. 
resented very few transactions made in connection with legal business. Very few 
bank accounts belonging to companies were referred to and in these cases a per-
sonal account was most often involved. This contrasts with the general interna-
tional statistical findings that revenues from economic crimes outnumber those 
from crimes in the cash based crime-economy (Van Duyne, 2007).  
 Despite this finding, most attention is still being paid to the most unsophisti-
cated money laundering committed by private persons with great cash bank de-
posits. What caused the transactions to be considered dubious was the fact that 
they did not correspond to the bank‟s knowledge of the person‟s private econ-
omy or the bank clerk‟s expectations of the economic status of the customers 
based upon their appearances as to clothing and ethnicity. 
 The same pattern comes to light in a review of suspicious transaction reports 
in the Netherlands during the period of 1994-1996 (Van Duyne and De Miranda, 
1999). The reports referred mainly to individuals with cash deposits. The trans-
actions were singled out because they did not match the person‟s employment 
income or the fact that they were benefit recipients. Business companies were 
more frequent among these reports then observed by Gold and Levi (1994) but 
still individuals and personal accounts were clearly in the majority.  
 The bank spokespersons support these findings. What very often aroused the 
bank‟s suspicion was the private person‟s cash deposits, which did not corre-
spond to the bank‟s knowledge of their personal economic situation. 
 Another indicator of the surveillance‟s inability to discover money launder-
ing within the framework of legal business activity comes to light in a survey 
made among stockbrokers in Norway (Axelsen and Hopsnes 2005).
11
 More than 
70 per cent of the stockbrokers claimed to be quite familiar with the customers‟ 
business structure. The National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of 
Economic and Environmental Crime had in the period 1996 – 2003 only re-
ceived 1-3 suspicious transaction reports from management/investment compa-
nies (Økokrim 2003). This indicates that the stockbrokers, even though accord-
ing to the survey, they are claiming to live up to the principle of knowing-their-
customer, do not discover existing money laundering.
12
 Does that mean that they 
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 Included are some cases where the stockbrokers have limited possibilities of know-
ing their customers. Some customers‟ relationships are superficial and consequently 
do not enable the stockbrokers to form an estimate of which transaction pattern will 
are simply missing most of the laundering transactions? It seems more plausible 
that in the light of this system of dense control not much laundering is going on. 
 A selection of convictions comprising money laundering (Ingvaldsen 2006) 
is conveying the same impression. A few companies are involved in the of-
fences, mainly because the defendants were employed in these firms. The legal 
structures of the companies were not used in connection with money laundering: 
the involvement was personal. The money laundering has not taken place based 
upon ordinary legal business transactions. For instance a man who assisted in 
laundering NOK 500.000 withheld from taxation by four Russians. This person 
entered into a fictitious tenancy agreement, apparently renting out a flat to the 
Russians. He was employed in a company not involved in letting property. The 
Russians paid in half a million kroners to an account that seemed to be the per-
sonal account of the Norwegian according to the sentence, claiming that this 
sum represented 4 years‟ prepaid rent.  
 A final empirical source confirms the observations above (Stedje 2004). She 
has analysed the 36 cases in 2001 where suspicious transaction reports was 
communicated to the Oslo police from The National Authority for Investigation 
and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime so these reports could 
be used in ongoing criminal proceedings.
13
 Less than 20 % of the reports in-
volved a company account. In more than 60 per cent of the cases a personal ac-
count was involved.
14
 
 In other words, a distinct pattern is reflected as to what the principle of know-
ing-your-customer fails to catch. Money laundering taking place within the 
framework of legal business activities, i.e. transactions where illegitimate ac-
tions in the form of money laundering are difficult to separate from legal trans-
actions, are to a very small extent being detected. This also applies to firms op-
erating in the securities market. Surveillance of money laundering is very selec-
tive. Principally private customers‟ simple transactions such as cash deposits are 
disclosed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
be the normal for the customers (Axelsen and Hopsnes, 2005). This will also apply 
for the securities enterprises and the banks. 
13
 None of the reports led to anyone being convicted of money laundering (Stedje 
2004). 
14
 In the remaining 20 per cent of the cases the reports did not have information about 
the kind of accounts referred to (Stedje 2004). 
Money laundering and white collar crime 
 
The way the money laundering regulation works makes laundering of money 
deriving from various white-collar crimes a quite natural consequence of the 
fraud technique (Van Duyne, 2003). This does not mean that all dirty money of 
such origin is being laundered in the criminological sense of the word. That is, 
giving the crime-money a legal appearance. On the contrary, in some cases the 
nature of white-collar crime is such that no money laundering is needed because 
the illegal profits are immediately integrated in the firm by the same documents 
used to defraud („tinned laundering‟). 
 Sometimes the amounts are too small to require any laundering technique. 
Larsson‟s (1995) study on tax evasion committed by Norwegian hairdressers is 
illustrative. His estimation is that the hairdressing trade‟s tax evasion amounts to 
NOK 300 – 600 millions per year. But the procedure utilized by each individual 
is such that the dirty money amounts to small sums and consequently there will 
be no need for laundering. The hairdressers regularly „cut‟ the payment from 
some customers. The amounts are so small that they disappear into ordinary 
daily consumption. This also seems to be the norm of proceeds for other forms 
of traditional, organised and low level white-collar crime. Though the total 
amount looks large, per unit it is little more than pilfering. 
 There are other sectors in the grey economy in which daily earned crime-
money siphons off into the licit economy. Ellingsen (1991) has studied tax eva-
sion in the Norwegian taxi business. Here too tax evasion is characterised by taxi 
drivers and owners lining their own pockets with a part of the customer‟s pay-
ment. Once again each sum is so small that there is reason to believe that money 
laundering is a non-existent topic among the trade representatives. 
 The restaurant industry‟s avoidance of taxes, rates and dues may also be con-
sidered as representing a grey zone in this connection. Axelsen (1995) has exam-
ined evasions in this business. According to the author‟s estimation which is 
partly based on the tax authorities‟ information on specific restaurants, it seems 
that some owners had an illegal profit up to NOK 100.000 during one week. 
Handling such large amounts of undeclared money over a relatively short period 
of time may create a need for money laundering.
15
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 It goes with this that some of the restaurant owners led a disorderly life that included 
a luxurious daily consumption pattern where a considerable part of the money was 
 A major condition for laundering money from economic crime would thus be 
that the profit is too large for managing it undetected within a short time span. 
This reduces the number of suspicious transaction reports concerning economic 
crime and the volume of illegal money generated for which a need for money 
laundering is experienced.  
 It should be remarked, that applying the broad definition of money launder-
ing, such as we find in the Convention of the Council of Europe or some authors 
like Walker (1995), spending any criminally obtained money in (daily) eco-
nomic life is laundering. This virtually equates the (fiscally) unrecorded money 
flow to laundering, depriving it from any discriminatory meaning. 
 
The Securities Markets: available to the few 
 
Another factor limiting the dirty money supply to the securities market is that 
few individuals will be considering this market as a channel of money launder-
ing available to them. Certainly, during the last years the securities market has 
been opened up to “most people”. Far more customers than before now consti-
tute average wage earners (Larsson 2001). However, few people have the appro-
priate knowledge of the securities market that is needed to make use of it for the 
purpose of money laundering. Van Duyne (2002) emphasises that the method of 
money laundering to a great extent is subject to the individual‟s social and cul-
tural capital, for example, in the sense of knowledge. Few customers will laun-
der money within a sector about which they have not sufficient knowledge in 
order to feel familiar and comfortable. Social capital in the sense of belonging to 
social networks is of great importance. Most people prefer to launder money in 
settings where they have friends and acquaintances who can contribute with both 
knowledge of and services for money laundering purposes. Against this back-
ground most people will choose to launder money in social circles familiar to 
them. Few will feel socially and culturally well-acquainted within the financial 
sector and the securities market in such a way that this market appears as a natu-
ral arena of money laundering. For quite a number of persons the Register of 
Securities, Oslo Stock Exchange, shares and bonds will represent such an un-
                                                                                                                        
used on expensive clothes, jewellery and cars (Axelsen 1995). In our perspective this 
fact has essentially contributed to reducing the need of money laundering, at any rate 
in the meaning of integrating the money into legal economy through banks or other 
financial institutions. 
known world. How many people will know that to trade listed shares it is obliga-
tory to open an account with the Register of Securities? 
 This mechanism is demonstrated in some of the descriptions given by the 
aforementioned police officers.
16
 The car- and building trades are good examples 
of how the actors knowing these sectors will keep within the same branches 
when laundering money. The two police officers state: 
“They don‟t start companies of their own. They will buy existing companies 
in sectors familiar to them. The car and building trades are recurring actors 
here. Craftsmen buy themselves way into the building trade where they can 
buy invoices covering fictitious income.”  
 
This is an important observation: contrary to the general idea that criminals find 
their way anywhere, criminals prefer personal direct contacts, also in the han-
dling of their criminal finances. Against this background, the securities market 
may be too distant and too abstract. 
 
 
Money laundering and organised crime17 
 
Media, public officials and advocates of strong action against money laundering 
seem to agree that „organised crime‟ is generating substantial amounts of „dirty 
money‟ and that this money is frequently laundered in the financial market. In 
threat assessments made by Oslo police and Politidirektoratet (The National Po-
lice Directorate) (2003) it is emphasised that there exist links between Oslo‟s 
financial world and organised crime. Well-known cases are those involving 
members of the biker gangs – notably of the Hells Angels and Bandidos - work-
ing as money collectors. The few cases uncovered indicate that there is some 
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 The descriptions originate from an interview made by Ingvaldsen (2006) in connec-
tion with his research project on money laundering in the Norwegian securities mar-
ket. 
17
 The term organized crime is highly politically loaded. It is used here in a way that 
covers the “common sense” meaning of the concept used by police, in politics and by 
media in Norway. The term covers mainly drug related crimes, trafficking and other 
traditional crimes committed in some organized way. Economic and financial crimes 
are rarely included and usually fall outside this “common sense” definition.     
connection between notorious members of „organised crime‟ groups and shadier 
exponents of the financial world.
18
 
 Most estimates of money laundering from „organised crime‟ are based on of 
meagre data if not on pure speculations, annedoctical “sensational” cases from 
abroad and extrapolations based on „conventional knowledge‟, all intensely re-
cycled until they become general truths. Nevertheless, such estimations remain 
very hypothetical and have repeatedly turned out to fail as the basis for state-
ments on the extent and methods of money laundering (Van Duyne 1996; Van 
Duyne et al., 2005), Naylor 2004, Reuter and Truman 2004). 
 „Organised crime‟ in Norway is limited to a few social circles and its scope is 
limited. The police estimate that there are between 103 and 125 criminal net-
works of some importance.
19
 The major types of violations connected with or-
ganised criminal groups in Norway are smuggling of prohibited or highly taxed 
substances (tobacco and alcohol) as well as violence (The Police Directorate 
2005). To a great extent the estimate may actually reflect the priorities of the 
police themselves as well as their qualifications. The following well-known „or-
ganised crime‟ networks20 are recorded in Norway (Larsson 2008): 
  The robbery milieu. The so-called robbery milieu in Norway consists of a 
small group of persons.
21
 They are specialists on robbery of transportation of 
valuables, banks and post offices. The average profit from a bank or post of-
fice robbery is usually limited while transportation of valuables might give 
larger profits. A number of the active persons belonging to this milieu are 
now imprisoned among other things in connection to the NOKAS robbery
22
. 
  Bikers. Opinions differ as to whether groups like Hell‟s Angels, Bandidos, 
Outlaws and the Pagans truly should be defined as groups of organised 
criminals or as an „alternative way of life‟ (Junninen 2006; Rørhus 1999). In 
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 For instance related to Aker Brygge Invest, a company surrounded by scandals, see 
among others Aftenposten February 10, 2001.  
19
 These are of course approximate figures and are not supposed to be understood oth-
erwise, but if nothing else, they are indicating that organised crime is of a limited ex-
tent.  
20
 We will not define organised crime here but adopt the definitions regularly used in 
Norway, i.e. EU‟s list of 11 articles (Larsson 2008 and Finckenauer 2005). 
21
 In “Project on organised crime” of the Police Directorate 18 important persons are 
connected with aggravated robbery. 
22
 The NOKAS robbery in Stavanger in 2004, named after the financial institution be-
ing robbed (Norsk kontantservice), is the biggest and best planned robbery in Nor-
wegian history. A police officer got shot and the robbers escaped with 57 million Nkr 
(5,7 million pounds). The robbers were heavy armed and it was fired 119 rounds.    
Norway these groups count, with the exception of the Pagans who have no 
section here, less than one hundred full-members.
23
 In Norway individuals 
are linked to import and trading of hash and amphetamine as well as being 
notoriously known as torpedoes.
24
 Hell‟s Angels members have been con-
victed in connection with extensive cases involving smuggling of hash and 
amphetamine and there is every indication that their activities as the men be-
hind the scenes, especially when it comes to smuggling of hash and am-
phetamine, can generate a considerable profit (Larsson 2006a). 
  Alcohol smugglers. Today‟s smugglers are keeping up a tradition dating 
back to the days of prohibition 1917 – 1927 (Johansen 2004). Until the cases 
involving selling methanol in 2001 – 2002 that caused the death of 11 per-
sons, smuggling was mainly linked to spirits. In the peak year 2001 254.000 
litres of strong spirits were confiscated. A substantial quantity of this was 
produced in Spain and Portugal and the profits were large.
25
 After 2002 – 
2003 smuggling has mostly been diverted to beer and wine and new actors 
have entered the scene (Larsson 2008). 
  Drug smugglers. The A- and B-gangs as well as the biker groups are among 
the most important actors when it comes to hash and tablets (amphetamine) 
There are also a number of minor and ephemeral groups involved in smug-
gling (Larsson 2006a). Hash and tablets are often smuggled simultaneously 
while heroin smuggling and dealing seem to be a separate market. Groups 
such as the Kosovo Albanians and the Nigerians have now and then played a 
prominent role within the heroin market. 
  The A- and B-gangs. The A- and the B gangs are two gangs predominantly 
of Pakistani origin. These two gangs developed in the mid to late 80‟s as 
youth street gangs. With growing age these gangs have evolved into organ-
ized crime groups (Larsson 2008). The members of the A-gang are now 
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 In the Police Directorate‟s evaluation of threats from 2003 is referred to figures that 
date back to 2001 in which year Hell‟s Angels had 36 members, the Bandidos ap-
proximately 25 and the Outlaws approximately 10. Lately the Outlaws have ex-
panded considerably. Rørhus (1999) reports that Kripos had registered 200 members 
in 1997 but does not mention their status. 
24
 The list of various types of criminality tied to these groups is a long one, but it is 
mostly traditional violations of the law and can to a small extent be linked to individ-
ual memberships in the clubs. The most interesting from a Nordic point of view is 
that they seldom seem to be involved in the market of prostitution. 
25
 At times we are here talking about big money. Smuggling spirits and alcolhol has 
always been more lucrative than narcotics. Taking into consideration the penalty lev-
el, from a rational point of view, everybody should be smuggling alcohol. 
mainly in their forties while members of the B-gang are more than 10 years 
younger. 24 members of the A-gang are identified and 29 in the B-gang. The 
gangs are notorious for violent clashes between the gangs. Of great interest 
is their profit making activities which in the main are supposed to be drug 
importation and dealing. The groups have good connections in the Nether-
lands and in Copenhagen and are engaged in the import and resale of hash. 
Sources in the police report that this generates substantial incomes that are 
then invested in Norway, Pakistan, Brazil and Thailand. 
  Foreign groups. Some activity from Estonian groups has been observed, but 
the Lithuanian criminals seem to be the most active (Larsson 2006b). If they 
really are Lithuanian is often another case, they often have passports bought 
in the town of Kaunas, but much indicates that these persons come from 
many eastern countries. So far these persons have mainly committed thefts 
of mobile phones, razor blades, nylon stockings as well as boat engines. 
Even if each single object has been of little value, they have sent out large 
quantities of the commodities. 
 
Prostitution and organised crime have attracted a great deal of attention. Until 
the new law that criminalized the buying of sex came into force on the first of 
January 2009, there were Nigerian and East-European girls (Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Poland and Albania) engaged in the highly visible street 
prostitution. When it comes to indoor prostitution mainly Thai girls are in-
volved. The Nigerian prostitutes are linked to organised Nigerian criminal net-
works (Nicola 2005). Behind the Baltic prostitutes we often find Baltic net-
works. The extent of force and exploitation exerted by these „assistants‟ seem to 
vary somewhat (Aromaa 2002). It also appears that there is a large range as to 
what extent the women are financially exploited. The whole range is represented 
from those running their own businesses to women economically exploited by 
pimps. For that reason it seems difficult to estimate how much money this activ-
ity generates that goes to organised criminal groups in Norway. 
 
 
Where does all the money go? 
 
It is worth noticing that most income sources of the „organised crime‟ groups are 
mainly based on the smuggling of illegal or heavily taxed stimulants such as 
narcotics, alcohol and tobacco. Initially the money laundering precautions were 
developed in the name of fighting drug offences (Levi 1991) which supposedly 
generated staggering amounts of crime-money. This is emphasised both in me-
dia and scientific literature (Dyrnes 2004; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). Conse-
quently it is noticeable that empirical studies on organised crime and illegal 
markets seldom find these activities to be as profitable as frequently claimed 
(Reuter and Greenfield 2001). It is well documented in international research 
papers that pushing of narcotics is far from representing a particular lucrative 
business. Desroches (2005) summarises research showing that “criminality 
doesn‟t pay” and that the street pushers usually do not end up with an incredible 
profit. 
“In short, most lower socio-economic dealers are involved only sporadically 
in drug sales, attempt to hold on to a conventional lifestyle, work at poor-
paying jobs, and struggle with periods of unemployment and poverty.” (Des-
roches 2005:4) 
 
Not all illegal trade is fully commercialised. Dorn, Murji and South (1992) point 
to the fact that many dealers sell narcotics privately to their friends and ac-
quaintances to finance their own drug abuse and partly as a friendly favour. This 
might seem old fashioned in continental Europe, but might still be a good de-
scription of the workings in Norway. The indications are that the greatest part of 
the drug dealing is not marketed to relatively distant traders, but among known 
contacts and friends (Parker 2000). The myth that the drug market should create 
extensive criminality because crimes-for-profit are financing drug purchases 
does not quite seem to fit in either. It might instead be more valuable to describe 
this market as a part of the irregular and informal economy (Ruggiero 1994, 
Gruppo Abele 2003). Brettville-Jensen has for years studied buying and selling 
of heroin in Oslo. She points out that the pushers are financing a lot of their own 
use through a combination of social security, begging and pushing. The main 
purpose of pushing is not to gain large profits but to finance their personal use. 
In any case, street pushing is not a glamorous life!
26
 
 What about the big smugglers and drug wholesalers? They must surely make 
handsome profits? That is possibly so, but to have a realistic perspective on the 
supplies of crime-money one needs more knowledge of the function and struc-
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 This is a well documented fact in international research as well. See Vesterhav, 
Skinnari and Korsell (2007), Sandberg and Pedersen (2006) and Levitt & Dubner 
(2007).  
ture of these markets. Smugglers are regularly presented as people making big 
fortunes. Estimations of the value of drug confiscations are mostly based on the 
street prices, while business expenses are rarely included (Van Duyne and Levi 
2005, Reuter and Greenfield 2001). 
 In a study on hash smuggling into Norway Larsson has tried to draw up a 
realistic calculation of this activity‟s profitability (Larsson 2006a, 2009). Hash is 
generally bought in the Netherlands. The price when buying large quantities is 
usually around NOK 15.000 per kilo depending on the quality. In Norway the 
selling price by wholesale of large quantities is approximately NOK 20.000 – 
25.000 which would make it possible to earn from NOK 5.000 – 10.000 per 
kilo.
27
 But in order to have the narcotics transported to Norway there will be ex-
penses, which at times they may be substantial. These expenses will, to some 
degree dependent on the smuggling technique, naturally cut back on the profit 
(25 – 50 per cent). Despite these operational costs it is possible to make large 
profits on smuggling of large quantities. Import of one hundred kilos could pos-
sibly give NOK 200 – 400.000 to be divided among the smugglers (mostly 5 or 
6 persons). But this activity entails risks. There is always the risk of being swin-
dled, of receiving bad hash, too small a quantity, occasionally friends are steal-
ing from the lot or at worst disappearing with it all.
28
 Junninens‟s (2006) infor-
mants reported how common it was to make a bad investment or a mistake. Be-
sides there is always a possibility to be caught which in Norway will result in 10 
– 15 years in prison for having smuggled 80 kilos of hash or more. These are the 
risks tied to hash smuggling.  
 Another significant element is that the hash market like any other drug mar-
ket primarily is based upon credit. In practice this means that very few will be 
handling the big packets of cash that often are described, which in turn implies 
that everybody will be owing money to somebody, that they often have to wait 
some time for the money and that some loss must be assumed. Van Duyne has 
used the term aquarium economy to describe this semi-closed criminal economy 
of credit. Practically it also means that somebody has to take on the task to 
physically be transporting the cash to the Netherlands. The arrangements are of 
course simpler when smuggling smaller volumes, however, the amount of 
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 The street price is estimated to NOK 100 per 0,7 gram, but the smugglers don‟t sell 
drug on the streets, they are selling to wholesalers who in turn will arrange for re-
sales. 
28
 In one of the cases in my material one of the couriers ran away with 420 kilos in 
Spain. Gross (1992) describes very well the dangers of this activity. 
money likely to be earned is smaller. Smugglers operating on a small scale and 
going to Copenhagen for half a kilo of weed are often operating in networks of 
friends who are both users and dealers. They will not generate a great volume of 
money for money laundering techniques are required. 
 Johansen (1996, 2004) has analysed alcohol smuggling and illicit distilling in 
Norway describing shifting markets where it is more advantageous to be small 
and flexible than big and „bureaucratic‟. Smuggling of alcohol is a typically 
Norwegian kind of organised crime with long traditions dating back to World 
War I or even earlier. He shows that a number of participants within this market 
occasionally are earning good money, but their ways of handling the money dif-
fer. Only a few will end up as wealthy and well established persons. A great deal 
live their lives based on high consumption and other such „bad habits‟ and are 
spending as much as they are earning. Junninen‟s (2006) Finnish organised 
criminals are living likewise: many of them are handling and spending signifi-
cant amounts but few will invest the money in something lasting. 
 Most sectors of organised crime markets do not generate the enormous 
amounts claimed.
29
 And if they do, the surplus savings in the sense of accumula-
tion of capital from these activities is far less than assumed. Granted, there are 
exceptions because the criminal wealth distribution is unequal but for most par-
ticipants in the organised crime markets, their crimes allows them to finance 
their drug habit, obtaining status symbols and gaining acceptance or quite sim-
ply a way of financing their lifestyles. 
 Nevertheless, at times a few crime-entrepreneurs succeed in earning substan-
tial money, especially within narcotics and alcohol smuggling. The question is 
then what this handful of organised criminals does with their money. Do they 
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 Walkers (1995, 2005) model „refined‟ by Unger (2007) is probably the best known 
and developed calculus of the amount of money laundering. This models starting 
point is a calculation of the proceeds of crime in the nations and takes the broadest 
definition of laundering: spending crime-money = laundering. Already at this point it 
is on thin ice since such calculations normally is based on substantial guessing about 
both volume of crime and prices of drugs. The models is based on layers of guessing 
and taken for granted knowledge about the hidden and criminal economy. It also tries 
to estimate the level of laundering for the different crimes. There seems to be mul-
tiple flaws in the model the most important is the idea that there is a need for laun-
dering money and that it must be used in the legal economy. Another is that the costs 
of crime are not calculated in. For drugs which is presented as the backbone of the 
criminal economy laundered money seems to be the same as the value of the smug-
gled drugs sold at street price, while many rightly point out that this is a wild exagge-
ration of the real value (Reuter and Greenfield 2001).       
invest it in the open and legal economy laundering it through advanced financial 
arrangements? 
 
Why there is no need for laundering and why there is no possibility 
for it. 
 
One of the problems of the “choose a number” calculation games that are con-
tinually presented in the money laundering literature has been the lack of knowl-
edge about the relationship between legal and illegal economies and how illegal 
economy and the criminal markets are functioning (Naylor 2002, 2003). Knowl-
edge about criminal carriers and diverging lifestyles and desires seem to be lack-
ing as well. Those who make the calculations take it for granted that everybody 
thinks, acts and shares their set of values. It is assumed that the actors are acting 
according to a specific kind of rationalism that fit in with the economic mod-
els.
30
 What if the criminals do not want to play this game or do not share the 
economists‟ understanding of a good life? 
 A good deal of the aforesaid underlines that the lifestyle among many crimi-
nals is not merely governed by economic rationality, but substituted by a combi-
nation of opportunities at hand, interest in narcotics and alcohol, “wine, women 
and song”, the sweet life as well as money (Gross, 1992; Adler 1993; and Jun-
ninen, 2006). When money starts pouring in consumption also usually increases. 
Having adapted to a life characterised by extensive consumption, it is difficult to 
change this. Money and private consumption often tend primarily to have sym-
bolic status functions.
31
 Adler (1993) describes the lifestyles of the great mari-
juana smugglers in California. Their money spending, as well as their use of 
drugs is impressive. Along with high incomes come great expenses to hotels, 
restaurants, cars, narcotics and friends, not to mention gambling. She is describ-
ing something that can be called a hedonistic lifestyle. The same goes for the A- 
and B-gangs in Oslo.  
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 The actors are usually made out to be typical utilitarians characterised by a purpose 
oriented rationality. See Larsson (1993). 
31
 Of course this is not a distinctive feature for criminals only, the same goes for a 
number of other economic actors such as for example, brokers within the financial 
world. Money gives status! 
“Expensive lifestyle: Elegant cars, narcotics, costly vacations, women whom 
are very generously treated and spending a lot of money in general”. (Nor-
wegian Police 2006:12)  
 
Obviously this kind of life will attract quite a few, but it also has an important 
function as a symbol of success. Besides, it creates and strengthens bonds be-
tween those involved in organised crime. Big time smugglers will often be big 
time spenders and their lifestyles are expensive. Quite a number of Adler‟s 
smugglers may be described as successful, but few of them managed to make a 
fortune or create permanent assets that they could use to withdraw from the 
scene. In fact it seemed as if very few took an interest in stashing away money, 
their concept of a good life being to avoid the trappings and boredom of a con-
ventional life. Similar findings are reported in Junninen‟s study (2006). One of 
his sources declares: 
“. . . at least one million per year is spent just on living. Suits and everything, 
they cost a lot. Everything is always the best that money can buy, like hotels 
and everything. That‟s what we are doing it for, so we can live like that. . . ” 
(Junninen 2006: 52) 
 
Reuter and Haaga (1989) and Desroches (2005) confirm this. Besides, quite a 
few are forgetting that the illegal economy is to a great extent an economy based 
un cash and that it still is possible to live a life using cash, even if it is becoming 
increasingly difficult. Gross‟ (1992) book dealing with the life of a big smuggler 
is an interesting reading. Even though the book is not recently written one would 
expect a chapter on money laundering. There is no such thing, but instead sev-
eral chapters are devoted on how to live a life based on cash only. Almost every-
thing can be bought with cash money although it occasionally demands some 
creativity. The book‟s mantra is never to leave a paper trail which the authorities 
can get hold of – “don‟t leave a paper trail”.  
 A major objection to the belief that criminals would want to convert into le-
gal business is the fact that many of the decisive skills to survive in illegal econ-
omy frequently are of less value in the legal one. In Van Duyne‟s (1996) study 
on the economy of large organised criminal networks his findings showed that 
not many of the actors in the illegal economy managed to work within the legal 
one. Most of them were rather helpless in their effort to run a legal business, but 
exceptions existed: 
“It has to be mentioned that most of the persons who were investing at a high 
profit in the legal economy had a background from ordinary legal business 
before they started their criminal careers!” (van Duyne 1996: 367) 
 
Nevertheless, there are a number of examples of financial investments made by 
criminals, but mostly these investments are in business activities they under-
stand, have personal knowledge of, and experience with. First and foremost it is 
to be supposed that considerable amounts are re-invested in the informal, illegal 
and criminal economy (Naylor, 2002; Skinnari and Korsell, 2007). Gross (1992) 
emphasises that many criminal enterprises need initial capital. As observed ear-
lier, part of such investments is done on mutual credit, even if it is risky. If no 
„criminal credits‟ are available the smuggling of substantial quantities of hash, 
cocaine, wine or alcohol can be an expensive business and is often in need of 
financing. The gains when lending money to this type of expeditions use to be 
far better than the usual bank interest, but then again the risks can be consider-
able. The profit from the well-known NOKAS robbery estimated to NOK 
57.000.000 partly ended up financing other crimes, among which 1000 kilos of 
hash were confiscated when imported to Norway. Why would someone invest 
their money legally when investment can be made in the illegal economy? The 
advantages of the illegal economy are numerous. There is no need to worry 
about being notified to the money laundering section at The National Authority 
for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økok-
rim). Within the illegal economy the money is accepted without unnecessary 
questions and in general the money is paid back at an acceptable rate of interest. 
The risk is higher, but for persons accustomed to an exciting risk-taking life this 
is not necessarily regarded as anything negative. 
 When money is invested in the illegal or grey market it seems, as mentioned 
earlier, that the favourites are pubs, restaurants, discos and companies that run 
business activities like selling cars, doing repairs etc. This corresponds very well 
to what the theory of routine activities preaches. These are enterprises the crimi-
nals often are familiar with, take an interest and are experienced in. Why should 
they invest their means in business activities they do not know anything about or 
are acquainted with? In a network perspective there are few, if any, reasons for 
an ordinary organised criminal to invest his profit in the financial market or se-
curities market.
32
 They do not know these markets or anybody engaged in such 
business and generally has no idea on how the finance- and securities markets 
are functioning, so why rely on them? From our point of view this represents a 
major objection to the idea that organised criminals are investing substantial 
amounts in the securities market. Van Duyne and Levi (2005) summarizing their 
own and Suendorff‟s (2001) observations came to similar conclusions. 
 Some will argue (Skinnari and Korsell, 2007) that they can make use of ex-
perts on money laundering to invest within this market. Few studies are able to 
prove that such utilization of experts is internationally widespread (Reuter and 
Truman 2004). As far as we know there is little evidence that such services have 
evolved in Norway. 
 Some of the most obvious effects of the increased effort towards fighting 
money laundering as well as confiscations are noticed in connection with the 
consumption patters and lifestyle of members of „organised crime‟ groups. Quite 
a number have reduced their use of visible status symbols such as Rolex 
watches, thick gold chains and expensive cars which will attract unwanted atten-
tion not only from friends but also from the police. In addition the police report 
that nowadays the money is invested abroad, in real estate in typical tourist areas 
such as Thailand, Venezuela and Brazil.
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 In criminological terms this represents 
a displacement effect and an adjustment to the new regulation. 
 
The mixture of legal and illegal in the Norwegian business sector 
 
However, there exists a way of laundering money from organised crime into 
“legal” companies. Seemingly legal companies can be used for dirty money to 
be invested in the ordinary and legal activities, or alternatively in activities alto-
gether illegal. Using these “front companies” will give the dirty money an ap-
pearance of legitimacy. Basically a restaurant owner will for instance have the 
opportunity of putting dirty money into ordinary and legal trade unnoticed. He is 
acting in a sector which is more or less based on cash, and related substantial 
cash transfers on a regular basis are normal practice. The bank clerk will have 
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 Studies report that to be connected with central traders on the stock exhange is of 
vital importance if one wants to make a career there.  
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 Since this was originally written there has been one of the biggest confiscation cases 
in Norway ever. Members from the A and B gang had invested millions in holiday 
houses and apartments in Brazil.     
little reason to suspect anything as long as the restaurant owner is not exaggerat-
ing his co-mingling of dirty money with „white‟ turnover or exceeding the bank 
clerk‟s conception of what will be normal business activity and earnings. Based 
upon his analysis of reports of money laundering from the British financial sec-
tor, Levi (1997) argues that money laundering regulation is only to a limited de-
gree able to catch criminal money channelled into legal economy through front 
companies. 
“. . . , there is little evidence to suggest that financial institutions are very 
successful at spotting the misuse of „front‟ companies for the intermingling 
of crime proceeds with legitimate takings.” (Levi 1997: 268) 
  
The mingling of the legal and the illegal within the framework of business ac-
tivities varies from country to country. Some cases will show an extensive min-
gling. Ruggiero (1996) give some examples from Italy where groups of organ-
ised criminals almost completely are in charge of an entrepreneur business sec-
tor. Nothing supports such a picture when it comes to Norway. On the basis of 
empirical analyses on various forms of organised crime both in Norway and in-
ternationally, Johansen (1996) qualifies the mixture of the legal and the illegal 
economy within Norwegian business as limited. Compared to a number of other 
countries, the connection between organised crime and business life is small in 
Norway, especially when it comes to drug entrepreneurs. Even so, there are ex-
amples of amalgamations of money earned on illegal alcohol markets. On sev-
eral occasions attempts has occurred to conceal illegal profit within business 
activity. Even if grey zones exist, primarily in connection with gains from the 
illegal alcohol markets, Johansen (1996) is of the opinion that as a whole the 
distinction between organised crime and business life is reasonably pronounced 
in Norway. 
 Johansen‟s (1996) empirical findings are somewhat old. Has things changed 
dramatically since his study? The police seem to think so. The aforementioned 
police officers that were interviewed as part of Ingvaldsen‟s (2006) study on 
money laundering in the Norwegian securities markets said the following when 
asked about criminals‟ connection to legal business: 
 “During the last three to five years we have seen a clear tendency towards a 
situation where every criminal has his own company, for instance people from 
the robbery milieu. This also applies to people involved in drug felonies. In gen-
eral this development involves organised criminals responsible for a vast amount 
of crime and which are part of criminal networks”. 
 
If taken as a statement on the overarching picture of the intermingling between 
business and organised crime in Norway, there is reason to treat the police offi-
cers descriptions critically. More recent studies of organised crime in Norway do 
not support the descriptions of the police officers. Both Johansen (2008) and 
Larsson (2008) concludes that there seem to have been a slight tendency towards 
more mixing of legal and illegal within business life. But their findings by no 
means support such a dramatic change that the police officers describe. 
 In accordance with Johansen (2008) and Larsson (2008) we can still say that 
organised crime has definitely not penetrated the legal economy in Norway. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We can draw some conclusions on what is stated above. The anti money laun-
dering regime is based on the principle of know-your-customer. This means a 
controlling eye that will arouse suspicion whenever something different from the 
ordinary patterns is spotted. Money laundering in connection with legal business 
activities, will regularly not be standing out. It will not leave the kind of traces 
that are presumed according to the methodology of “follow the money”. It cer-
tainly will leave a paper trail, but not one that does have a suspicious character. 
In this respect neither the banks‟ nor the securities enterprises‟ control are likely 
to be aware of it, unless they carry out a deeper investigation. The regulators 
predominantly uncover simple transactions made by individuals, what is easily 
to recognize because of the customer‟s private economy and personal appear-
ance. Then this selectively controlling eye also opens up for money laundering 
via apparently legal business activities with mixed legal and the illegal money 
flows. For the shrewd launderer this leaves room for channelling money from 
organised crime into the finance sector through business activities. 
 In the light of this there is reason to believe that money laundering in the 
Norwegian securities markets may happen, although there is no empirical 
sources substantiate this threat. Concurrently our analyses of the conditions of 
money laundering are indicating that the authorities‟ and media‟s suppositions 
and calculations as to the extent of money laundering are unrealistically high. In 
some cases economic crimes are committed in ways which will generate an ille-
gal profit it may be big enough for all kinds of money laundering constructions. 
This applies also to a good deal of other forms of „organised criminality‟. The 
illegal profit deriving for instance from drug felonies will for quite a few be very 
limited. To a good many people criminality represents business on the side, 
criminal expenses are incurred, the net profits are financing their own drug use 
etc. Some are making great money, but quite a few will be using the profit to 
live a hedonistic life with high daily consumption. Others have no wishes of in-
tegrating the dirty money into legal economy. It is safer to keep it within the un-
derground economy. There is little reason to believe that money from organised 
crime is channelled into the financial sector by those wanting to launder their 
gains. The blending of the legal and the illegal in Norwegian business life is lim-
ited in scope. Lastly, to many people the securities markets are hardly accessible 
as an arena of money laundering, both socially and culturally. That is why 
money is being laundered elsewhere, in settings which the actors have knowl-
edge of and will rely upon. 
 Consequently the most likely money launderer in the Norwegian securities 
market will be characterised as follows: He is operating within legal economic 
activity, the dirty money comes from specific kinds of economic crime such as 
insider trading and currency manipulation, the illegal profit is relatively large 
and he knows very well the securities market. He has both the need for and the 
possibility to launder money through the securities market, where the money is 
already on some bank account. 
 
If we return to the opening of this article we see that many of the assumptions 
that make the fundament of the fight against money laundering does not seem to 
be well documented. There is the basic idea that criminal activity, and specially 
organised crime generates vast sums that have to be laundered to be used or re-
invested. Many forms of crime do not generate great profits per operation and, 
also, what matters are the profits per business and not the accumulated profits 
for the whole criminal sector. The costs of crime and the reinvestment of what-
ever leftovers into new crimes are often underestimated. To a rather large degree 
the criminal economy can be seen as a rather closed, aquarium like economy. 
Many studies have also documented that the lure of a life in crime is often to be 
a big spender and live a fast life. Probably only few exponents of the criminal 
economy probably share the ideals preached in business schools around the 
world.   
 So here we are then, with a massive apparatus designed to catch certain 
forms of taken for granted illegal activity and big crime-money being washed in 
the securities sector. This big fishing net constructed to catch some types of fish 
does not seem to work that well. At the same time we do not say that there are 
not big fishes or even financial whales in this ocean. But how many of these are 
there and are these worth the huge efforts? If they exist, the system does not 
seem to catch them or even detect them. Instead we end up with the some well 
known figures, the easily detectable and highly visible „usual suspects‟.  
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